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Abstract 
 Universally true generalizations, from which specific conclusions can 
be deduced, are often unavailable to the practitioner, defined as anyone 
carrying out an occupation or profession. Theoretical shortcomings in the 
body of knowledge presented by academics can be counteracted by the 
practitioner using his or her knowledge of problem solutions. These can be 
stored as particular cases or as more generalized design patterns. They will 
typically contain information about cause-and-effect relationships and 
normative information about acceptable solutions. Use can be made of these 
solutions by employing reasoning by analogy and case-based reasoning. 
Similar problems require similar solutions. Cause-and-effect theory can be 
generated by practitioners using abstraction from particular cases, as an 
alternative to enumerative induction. The difference between this theory and 
that of the academic can be largely one of degree of generality. There is a 
continuum of cause-and-effect relationships at different levels of abstraction, 
which does not justify the abrupt separation of the academic and practitioner 
worlds, which has been encouraged by a reasonable interpretation of 
Bernstein’s work. The study of exemplary problems in vocational education 
can be made more effective if it is accompanied by an examination of the 
actual outcomes of previously proposed solutions.   
 
Keywords: Analogy, vocational education, design patterns, case-based 
reasoning, abstraction  
 
Introduction 
 This paper aims to make a small contribution to the debate on the 
relationship between theory and practice in vocational settings. Academics 
may complain that not enough theory is taught in vocational education. 
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Employers may feel that the theory which academics teach does not have 
enough relevance to their practical needs.  
 I take it that a conventional view of theory is that it is a 
systematically organised body of propositional knowledge which will 
typically contain universal generalizations, from which we can make 
deductive inferences about specific cases (Winch, 2010, p.104, p.186). If this 
deductive model were to be generally applicable, then how we apply theory 
to specific situations would be quite straightforward. The beauty of 
universally true generalizations is that they are true regardless of the 
particular circumstances. There is no need to worry about contexts because 
they do not affect the validity of the universal generalization. A deduction 
can be expressed as a syllogism: 
1. The major premise: “All merryjumpers have four legs”. 
2. The minor premise: “Henrietta is a merryjumper”. 
3. Conclusion: “Henrietta has four legs”. 
 Unfortunately, there are good reasons to believe that such a 
convenient link between theory and practice is often not available to us. 
 
Nancy Cartwright and Models 
 Nancy Cartwright argued that the fundamental laws of physics are 
distortions of reality, which is less tidy and less readily regimented than the 
laws themselves would suggest (Cartwright , 1983, p.162). She claimed that 
“models are essential to theory. Without them there is just abstract 
mathematical structure, formulae with holes in them, bearing no relation to 
reality” (Cartwright, 1983, p.159). “Laws, where they do apply, hold only 
ceteris paribus [other things being equal]” (Cartwright, 1999, p.4). Reality 
may just be a complicated patchwork of laws (the dappled world) 
(Cartwright, 1999, p.34). The theories of physics cannot typically be applied 
deductively (Cartwright, 1999, p.9). What is needed to relate theories to 
practice are causal laws, and these are usually embedded in models drawn up 
to serve a specific purpose, and the models are of limited scope (Cartwright, 
1983, p.152). To advance the argument expressed in this paper, I simply note 
the importance of causal relationships in relating theory to reality, that 
models are of limited scope, and that the deduction of specific conclusions 
from theory is often not feasible. 
 In more recent years there has been a growing interest in scientific 
models rather than universal laws. Bailer-Jones (2009, p.206) combined a 
philosophical treatment of the subject with interviews of scientists. She 
argued that the emphasis on models is consistent with current scientific 
practice. Weisberg (2013, p.7) outlined the use of concrete, computational 
and mathematical models. He saw a model as an “interpreted structure that 
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can be used to represent a real or imagined phenomenon” (Weisberg, 2013, 
p.15).  
 Multiple models may be required to describe a particular situation, 
depending on the purpose in hand. Weisberg followed Richard Levins in 
asserting that “The multiplicity of models is imposed by the contradictory 
demands of a complex heterogeneous nature and a mind that can only cope 
with few variables at a time; by the contradictory desiderata of generality, 
realism, and precision” (Weisberg, 2013, p.104). There is an emphasis on 
“structural and causal relationships within the target phenomenon” being 
included in the model (Weisberg, 2013, p.106). It should be noted how we 
decide whether a model applies to a particular situation; “…successful 
models are similar to their targets” (Weisberg, 2013, p.142). This is not a 
process of deductive inference. It is something closely akin to reasoning by 
analogy, which will be discussed later.  
 
Looking for a Cause 
 Discontent with the body of theory can be detected in a number of 
intellectual disciplines. In the field of sociology, Robert Merton (1949/2012, 
p.531) had become disillusioned with “general theories of social systems 
which are too remote from particular classes of social behaviour, 
organization, and change to account for what is observed”. He proposed the 
development of “middle-range theory” to guide empirical enquiry. He 
wanted to identify “social mechanisms” (causal relationships), the existence 
of which would be empirically testable. He hoped to get beyond high level 
theories, developed by people from different schools of thought, which were 
often seen as mutually exclusive and at odds with each other (Merton, 
1949/2012, p.536). 
 This search for causal mechanisms (cause-and-effect theory) was 
carried on by researchers such as Hedstrom & Vlikoski (2010). They noted 
that mechanism-based scientific explanations had increased in popularity 
“partly motivated by the shortcomings of the once hegemonic covering-law 
account of explanation” (Hedstrom & Vlikoski, 2010, p.50). They noted that 
there is a shortage of the high-level covering laws from which we can deduce 
conclusions (Hedstrom & Vlikoski, 2010, p.55). What this approach leaves 
open is the possibility that conclusions can be deduced from what may be 
thought of as mini-causal laws. By reducing the scope of the causal claims, it 
may be possible to build cause-and-effect theory at a lower level than was 
previously attempted.  
 In psychology, Pieter van Strien (1997, p.683) has argued for “the 
improvement of individual problem-situations with the help of low-level 
problem-directed theories” and that “the simple top-down model of practice 
as application of ready-made theories has long since been abandoned”.  In 
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outlining an alternative, he says that “practice is not, as in the top-down 
conception, the application of an already existing theory to the individual but 
the generation of a mini-theory of the individual case” (van Strien, 1997, 
p.685). Academic science “looks for truth: it approaches its object as 
something to be explained (explanandum). Practice, on the contrary, looks 
for improvement: it approaches its object as something to be changed 
(mutandum)” (van Strien, 1997, p.686). Important to making improvements 
will be the causal mechanisms that bring them about.  
 Joan van Aken (2004, p.219) felt that “there are serious doubts about 
the actual relevance of present-day management theory as developed by the 
academic community”. There was a concern that the business world may be 
largely ignoring academic research in business schools. Van Aken thought 
that “all good theories are practical, but some are more practical than others”. 
His aim was “the development of scientific knowledge to solve a class of 
managerial problems, in other words, the development of abstract 
knowledge” (van Aken, 2004, p.220). “A design exemplar is a general 
prescription which has to be translated to the specific problem at hand; in 
solving that problem, one has to design a specific variant of that design 
exemplar” (van Aken, 2004, p.227). Problem solutions imply the need for 
knowledge of the causes that can bring about the states of affairs regarded as 
solutions. 
 There are many reasons why it may be too optimistic to believe that 
vocationally useful specific conclusions can be regularly deduced from 
academic theory. Much theory is not in the form of empirical 
generalizations. For instance, in the field of education, Laurillard & 
Ljudojevic (2011, p.89), pointed out that a lot of theory is in the form of 
principles of good practice which are difficult to interpret, and specific 
conclusions cannot be deduced from them. Key terms in a theory may be 
undefined or unclear. It may simply be difficult to know to which practical 
circumstances any given theory may apply. Some theory is in the form of 
universal generalizations that are not universally true. They are true in most 
cases or generally true. They are perhaps heuristics or rules of thumb. Most 
damaging of all, the theory may not provide details of causal relationships 
which will help address problems, or prevent problems from occurring. The 
theory may not be easily testable in practice. We might say of all of these 
limitations that there is a significant logical distance between the theory and 
its application in practice.  
 Implicit in a lot of the literature is the belief that modern vocational 
education is just a continuation of technical education. Engineering and 
construction no doubt still draw on a lot of hard science which explains how 
materials behave under certain conditions. However in the modern British 
economy, fewer and fewer people are involved in the manipulation of wood, 
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metal, concrete and other materials to make things. They are engaged in 
public administration, banking and insurance, education, social care, retail, 
distribution/transport, IT, hospitality/tourism, and customer service. These 
are areas where it is less likely that there will be a significant body of theory 
from which conclusions can be literally deduced.  
 The criticism of academic theory by practitioners should not be 
interpreted too hastily as anti-intellectualism. It is often a pragmatic 
complaint that the practitioner is being handed damaged goods. The flat pack 
has arrived with a number of the key parts missing. The question of just how 
important a body of academic or scientific theory is in addressing specific 
vocational problems is, of course, an empirical issue, and the answer may 
differ depending on the domain. There is certainly scope here for empirical 
studies which start with the solutions to vocational problems and work 
backwards to see what part theory, viewed as a systematically organised 
body of knowledge, has played in their solution. The question then arises as 
to whether we are theoretically helpless in the cases where the organized 
body of theory does not obviously apply or, less charitably, where it is full of 
holes.  
 
Bernstein and Recontextualisation 
 The scepticism about the adequacy of a deductive account of how 
theory is related to practice has created a search for alternative explanations. 
A number of academics, particularly those who have been associated with 
the University of London’s Institute of Education, have believed that Basil 
Bernstein provided some of the answers.  
 He contributed two central ideas. Firstly, that knowledge is separated 
into vertical and horizontal realms or “discourses”. The vertical has 
sometimes been associated with theory and academia; the horizontal with the 
world of practice. Secondly, that the way vertical knowledge is applied to a 
particular situation (to practice) is through a process of recontextualisation.  
 “Briefly, a vertical discourse takes the form of a coherent, explicit 
and systematically principled structure, hierarchically organised, as in the 
sciences, or it takes the form of a series of specialised languages with 
specialised modes of interrogation and specialised criteria for the production 
and circulation of texts, as in the social sciences and humanities” (Bernstein, 
1999, p.159). “A horizontal discourse entails a set of strategies, which are 
local, segmentally organised, context specific and dependent, for maximising 
encounters with persons and habitats” (Bernstein, 1999, p.159). “Thus, in the 
case of horizontal discourse, its ‘knowledges’, competences and literacies are 
segmental. They are contextually specific and ‘context dependent’, 
embedded in on-going practices, usually with strong affective loading, and 
European Scientific Journal March 2017 edition Vol.13, No.7 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
6 
directed towards specific, immediate goals, highly relevant to the acquirer in 
the context of his/her life” (Bernstein, 1999, p.161). 
 In the horizontal dimension, the individual has repertoires of 
strategies, and the community has reservoirs of such strategies (Bernstein, 
1999, p.159). Not surprisingly in a vocational context, the vertical domain, 
often identified as the preserve of academics and scientists, has come to be 
seen as the source of knowledge, whereas the horizontal is sometimes seen 
as the home of skills with narrow applicability.  
 Michael Young (2006) tried to maintain Bernstein’s framework, but 
only at the expense of caricaturing the practitioner’s “horizontal” domain. 
Vocational knowledge was said to be “often uncodifiable” (Young, 2006, 
p.113); “cannot be made explicit” (Young, 2006, p.119); is produced “‘in a 
context’ – it is never entirely context free” (Young, 2006, p.114-115); and 
“embodies no explicit principles” for transferring knowledge across 
occupational sectors (Young, 2006, p.118).  
 Gamble (2006, p.89) argued that “Context-independent meanings 
refer to that which exists only in abstract form. Context-dependent meanings 
refer to meanings that derive from concrete events or experiences that have 
actually happened in a specific time and place”. 
 Of course, where knowledge comes from is not particularly relevant. 
A very general theory can be produced after studying very specific events. 
All theory is applicable in only certain contexts. How many contexts are 
involved is only a difference of degree. As we shall see, a specific event 
which causes another specific event in a specific context is always 
generalizable. Further, there is no reason why a practitioner’s knowledge of 
the causal relationships that can help solve problems cannot be made 
explicit. These causal relationships are often relevant to multiple 
occupational domains. 
 As David Guile (2014, p.80) put it, “every type of human activity is 
encountered and employed contextually. This does not mean, however, that 
forms of activity, or for that matter resources, are context-bound: human 
intentionality allows them to be used in different ways in different contexts”. 
There is a “commingling of the theoretical and everyday, rather than moving 
between separate conceptual and practical spheres” (Guile, 2014, p.80). We 
are always capable of seeing the general in the particular (Weinreb, 2005, 
p.124). 
 Bernstein’s analysis threatened to build a new Berlin Wall between 
theory and practice. It left academia open to a charge of occupational self-
interest. Propositional knowledge was primarily its preserve and, by 
comparison, the knowledge possessed by the practitioner was a very poor 
thing and of little general interest. It portrayed academia in the best possible 
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light, and was in danger of encouraging a rather condescending attitude 
towards the practitioner. 
 Starting from this analysis it became very difficult to specify how 
knowledge actually passed from theory to practice. Bernstein suggested that 
this was through a process of recontextualisation. The problem is that this 
term is never given a satisfactory definition. Bernstein tends to define it in 
terms of other concepts which are themselves undefined or not in common 
use. The overwhelming impression is that the word recontextualisation 
expresses a praiseworthy aspiration to relate theory to particular situations, 
without ever providing enough jargon-free guidance to allow a keen student 
to actually go out and recontextualise something.  
 As a sociologist, Bernstein was probably wearied by the battles of the 
ideological factions in his subject, coming to see these factions as speaking 
different languages. This coloured his perception of what he saw as 
horizontal knowledge. He wrote, almost wistfully, “I suppose that the view 
would be markedly improved if the discursive centre of gravity shifted from 
the specialised languages to issues of empirical description: a shift from 
commitment to a language to a problem and its vicissitudes” (Bernstein, 
1999, p.170).  
 Here Bernstein saw the way ahead through a glass darkly. The focus 
on problems would have led him to search for the causal mechanisms 
necessary to address these problems, and that may in turn have punched a 
hole in the Berlin Wall between theory and practice by showing that 
practitioners just might be the guardians of some cause-and–effect theory. 
Causality can be the bridge which relates theory to practice, and brings 
closer the worlds of the academic and the practitioner.  
 Subsequent writers, labouring under the intolerable burden of 
Bernstein’s framework, have nevertheless provided a number of clues about 
what recontextualisation may have meant. David Layton (1993, p.58) 
suggested that sometimes we have to adjust the level of abstraction. This is a 
promising line of enquiry which will be pursued later in this paper. Jim 
Hordern  (2014, p.23) probably referred to the same issue as Layton in 
writing about “‘generalisation’ and ‘particularisation’”. He also highlights 
the selection of knowledge for a particular purpose (Hordern, 2014, p.24). In 
this paper that purpose will be primarily to address a particular problem.  
 
Herbert Simon and Design Science 
 Herbert Simon (1981, p.xi) believed that “Engineering, medicine, 
business, architecture, and painting are not concerned with the necessary but 
with the contingent – not with how things are but with how they might be – 
in short, with design”. Expressed slightly differently, these design sciences 
are concerned with how things ought to be in order to attain certain goals 
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(Simon, 1981, p.7). Sometimes the production of artefacts is seen as 
necessary to achieve these goals (Simon, 1981, p.133). 
 The concepts of design and artefact are, however, not defined in a 
restrictive way. “Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at 
changing existing situations into preferred ones. The intellectual activity that 
produces material artifacts is no different fundamentally from the one that 
prescribes remedies for a sick patient or the one that devises a new sales plan 
for a company or a social welfare policy for a state” (Simon, 1981, p.129).  
 Building on Simon’s argument, I should like to say that what is of 
value here is the design of a solution to a problem. Central to the design of a 
solution will be an understanding of causal relationships. These causes may 
be generative (bringing about a new situation) or preventative (maintaining 
the current situation in a safe, or otherwise desirable, state). The design of 
solutions should include diagnostic problems where, given a series of known 
effects, the practitioner judges the most likely causes (a form of abductive 
reasoning or reasoning to the best explanation) (Josephson & Josephson, 
1996; Walton, 2004). It should also include plans to meet a need, economic 
or otherwise. This highlights the causative aspect of problem solutions. 
 There is also a normative aspect, which sets the goals we are aiming 
for in trying to solve a problem and, indeed, defines what is a problem and 
what is not. 
 
Means and Ends 
 Simon had what is often described as an instrumentalist approach to 
this normative dimension. The designer is presented with some goal (or end) 
and then designs the most efficient means of achieving that goal or of 
maximizing the value of some variable. Simon (1981, p.135-136) uses some 
unusual terminology, but fortunately he also provides a means of translating 
it into more familiar language (shown in the square brackets). “Problem: 
Given the constraints [costs] and fixed parameters [laws], find values of the 
command variables [means] that maximize the utility [ends].” 
 He acknowledges that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is” 
(Simon, 1981, p.8). However, a discussion about the appropriateness of goals 
is avoided by treating the ends to be pursued as simply given to the designer. 
The design process is, seemingly just a technical task of selecting the most 
efficient means of achieving some end, taking account of all the 
circumstances. 
 There are two objections to this approach, one economic and the 
other more ethical. Both require that the end be regarded as provisional, and 
likely to change or be abandoned after evaluating costs and consequences.  
 In vocational education literature there is a strong bias towards 
production values. Students are to acquire the knowledge and skills which 
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will permit them to produce goods and services. Given less emphasis is the 
economic and marketing knowledge which will tell the employee why he or 
she is being paid to exercise skills, and the factors that will influence whether 
or not he or she will go on getting paid. 
 In economic terms, goals or ends are dictated primarily by customers 
or other stakeholders, although business can always be declined on the 
grounds of conscience. Goods and services are produced and (usually) sold 
when there is a want backed up by a willingness and ability of someone to 
pay. All economic demand is demand at a particular price. An evaluation of 
costs and consequences will not only determine the best means to achieve 
some pre-determined goal. It will determine what that goal is. In economics, 
the goal can be adjusted or abandoned after costs and consequences have 
been evaluated.  
 There is also an ethical dimension. In evaluating costs and 
consequences, we may find that the end can be achieved, but only at a 
terrible human cost which is politically and ethically unacceptable. It may 
also be a public relations disaster. As the likely negative effects pile up, the 
chances of the end being pursued decrease. The end is likely to be radically 
amended, or scrapped.  
 There is a supplementary point which needs to be made. A problem is 
always a problem for someone. What one person regards as a problem to be 
solved, another person may see as no problem at all. The same is true of 
solutions. A new state of affairs may be regarded as a solution by one person 
and not by another. For this reason, a problem is never simply a state of 
affairs, although we may sometimes be tempted to think that it is. It has the 
status of a problem only because of its relationship with someone’s values. 
 People may not be able to say in advance what they want. They may 
only be able to recognize it when they see it. This is a notorious problem for 
systems analysts who try to get customers to specify the kind of computer 
system they want. Vocationally, the goal is often not something that is fixed 
in advance, but is something that is discovered by a process of presenting 
potential solutions. Ultimately the goal may be best expressed in terms of 
pleasing the customer or some other stakeholder, and which artefact or state 
of affairs will achieve that is initially unclear. An appreciation of likely 
customer values would be useful here.   
 Whether it be on economic or more ethical grounds, a purely 
instrumental view, where practitioners as a whole are concerned only with 
means rather than ends, is not sustainable. Under the division of labour, 
certain individuals may be relieved of the responsibility of thinking about 
ends, but this is likely to be counter-productive. The more people who are 
worrying about the needs of the customer, and the consequences of the 
practitioner’s actions, the better. 
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 The approach suggested here is somewhat similar to that of John 
Dewey’s. The means and ends should be regarded as a combined package. 
The decision is therefore always between one means-end package and 
another. This should help us not to pursue some utopian goal obsessively 
without regard to the terrible costs and consequences (Dewey, 1939, p.24). 
 
Donald Schön 
 The work of Donald Schön (1991) was something of a reaction 
against those who stressed the dominant role of academic and scientific 
knowledge in the work of the practitioner. He was concerned with 
professionals rather than all vocational occupations, but his views are very 
relevant to some of the themes set out in this paper. 
 He argued that “The situations of practice are inherently unstable”, 
and this also applied to the body of knowledge required by practitioners 
(Schön, 1991, p.15). They were faced with “problematic situations 
characterized by uncertainty, disorder, and indeterminacy” (Schön, 1991, 
16). What was needed was “an artful practice of the unique case” rather than 
“application of established techniques to recurrent events” (Schön, 1991, 
p.19). 
 After a dramatic opening to his book, which questions the value of a 
body of theory to someone facing unique problems, Schön outlined a 
position that was not quite consistent with the sensational headlines. He 
finally conceded that “In some parts of practice – medicine, engineering, 
dentistry, management, for example – practitioners can and do make use of 
knowledge generated by university-based researchers” (Schön, 1991, p.308).  
 Although a mysterious reflection-in-action was seen by Schön as the 
answer to addressing problematical situations, the actual examples he gives 
see the master practitioner drawing on a body of past experience. Situations 
may be technically unique, but they are usually sufficiently like previous 
problematical situations to make use of a body of knowledge. 
 “Faced with some phenomenon that he finds unique, the inquirer 
nevertheless draws on some element of his familiar repertoire which he treats 
as exemplar or as generative metaphor” (Schön, 1991, p.269). We might say 
that the practitioner uses reasoning by analogy. 
 “Organizations, furthermore, are repositories of cumulative built-up 
knowledge: principles and maxims of practice, images of mission and 
identity, facts about the task environment, techniques of operation, stores of 
past experience which serve as exemplars for future action. When a manager 
reflects-in-action, he draws on his stock or organizational knowledge, 
adapting it to some present instance” (Schön, 1991, p.242). That stock of 
knowledge could include knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships. 
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Looking past the headlines and the jargon, the process now seems to be more 
recognizable.  
 Schön did rightly criticize a view that “Practical knowledge was to be 
construed as knowledge of the relationship of means to ends. Given 
agreement about ends, the question, ‘How ought I to act?’ could be reduced 
to a merely instrumental question about the means best suited to achieve 
one’s ends” (Schön, 1991, p.33). The practitioner “does not keep means and 
ends separate, but defines them interactively” (Schön, 1991, p.68). This issue 
has already been addressed in this paper. However, it is not altogether clear 
that Schön acknowledged that if the practitioner is going to be concerned 
with both means and ends, he or she will need a lot of knowledge about 
causal relationships to compare various means-end combinations. This 
knowledge may come from a body of academic theory, or from the 
practitioner’s past experience.   
 
Design Patterns 
 Christopher Alexander, working in the field of architecture, is often 
credited with being one of the first people to write about design patterns. He 
and his colleagues gave this definition: “Each pattern describes a problem 
which occurs over and over again in our environment, and then describes the 
core of the solution to that problem, in such a way that you can use this 
solution a million times over, without ever doing it the same way twice” 
(Alexander et al, 1977, p.x).  
 Here is another definition from the field of education: “In our view a 
design pattern is a semi-structured description of an expert’s method for 
solving a recurrent problem, which includes a description of the problem 
itself and the context in which the method is applicable, but does not include 
directives which bind the solution to unique circumstances. Design patterns 
have the explicit aim of externalizing knowledge to allow accumulation and 
generalization of solutions and to allow all members of a community or 
design group to participate in discussions relating to the design” (Mor & 
Winters, 2006, p.66).  
 There may be a significant logical distance between theory and 
practice. Theoretical principles may need a great deal of additional work 
before they can be applied to vocational problems. In looking at the body of 
theory that has been handed to us, we may feel like the person who has been 
promised lamb chops, only to be presented with a live sheep and a meat 
cleaver. We are left with too much work to do. 
 What perhaps we need are methods of storing more highly processed 
information that focus on problem solutions. These data structures will need 
to be able to store vocationally relevant causal relationships as well as 
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courses of action (means-end packages) which have been considered to be 
acceptable.  
 Mason (1994, p.188, p.192) wrote about a practitioner having a 
covenant with reality and a covenant with values. That applies here. We need 
a repository for causal relationships and values. The candidate for 
consideration in this paper is the design pattern. 
 Inspired by Simon’s suggestions, there has emerged a very healthy 
design science literature (Wieringa, 2014; Johanneson & Perjons, 2012; van 
Aken et al, 2011; Hevner et al, 2004; Dresch et al, 2015). The main practical 
goal of these design scientists has been to create a viable alternative to 
conventional academic research, particularly at a postgraduate level. The 
typical project aims to produce an innovative design, possibly to make the 
equivalent of a unique contribution to knowledge. There are some 
similarities between design science and the field of educational design 
research (McKenney & Reeves, 2012; Van den Akker et al, 2006).  
 Parallel to this development, and to a great extent independent of it, 
has been an intellectual movement promoting the value of design patterns. 
This tradition concentrates rather more on tried and trusted solutions to 
problems that can be reused by practitioners. 
 The strength of the design pattern concept is that there is no one 
dominant structure which has imposed itself on all fields of inquiry, 
regardless of their particular needs. A selection of suggestions about 
structure is set out in Table 1 below. They come from architecture 
(Alexander, 1977), computer programming (Gamma et al, 1994), and 
education (Bergin, 2012; Laurillard, 2012).  
Table 1: What Is in a Design Pattern? (Kingsley, 2015, p.66) 
Author Structure of the Design Pattern 
Alexander (1977)  Short Name, Rating , Sensitizing Picture [something 
visual], Context Description, Problem Statement, 
Text with Examples and Explanations, Solution 
Statement, Sketch, Further References 
Gamma et al (1994)  Pattern Name and Classification, Intent, Also Known 
As, Motivation (Forces), Applicability, Structure, 
Participants, Collaboration, Consequences, 
Implementation, Sample Code, Known Uses, Related 
Patterns   
Bergin (2012)  Problem/Issue, Audience/Context, Forces, Solution, 
Discussion/Consequences/Implementation,  Special 
Resources, Related Patterns, Example Instances, 
Contraindications,  References 
Laurillard (2012)  Origins, Summary, Topics, Learning Outcome, 
Rationale, Duration, Learners, Setting, Resources 
and Tools, Learning Cycles, Designer’s Reflection 
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 A flexible structure such as a design pattern is capable of 
accommodating universal generalizations, practitioner cause-and-effect 
theory, references to models and specific cases, details of skills needed to 
execute the solution, and a rationale for the values which lead to something 
being regarded as a problem, and something else subsequently being 
regarded as a solution. Identifying an appropriate solution will involve an 
analogical ability to recognise a relevant pattern.   
 
A New Look at Theory and Generalizability 
 I asked whether we are theoretically helpless in the cases where the 
organized body of theory does not obviously apply. Fortunately the answer is 
no, because where the contribution of largely academic and scientific theory 
ends, practitioner theory can take over.  
 Alongside the definitions of theory that would be recognized by 
academics, the Oxford English Dictionary provides this definition: “A 
conception of something to be done, or of the method of doing it; a 
systematic statement of rules or principles to be followed”. In the spirit of 
this definition, I should like to suggest that in vocational matters, a central 
need is a theory about how to solve a problem. This should involve a 
covenant with reality and a covenant with values. 
 It has been suggested that the design pattern can be a suitable data 
structure for storing details about problem solutions. It could therefore be 
argued that design patterns are suitable structures to contain a theory about 
how to solve a problem. 
 The challenge then is to prevent this becoming the solution to just a 
specific problem in a specific set of circumstances. How do we generalize to 
other cases? The first step is to shake off the shackles imposed by a very 
narrow concept of generalizability. One definition of “generalize” is given 
by the Oxford English Dictionary: “To make (a proposition, theorem, etc.) 
general in form or application; to extend (a proposition, theorem, etc.) so as 
to cover a wider or more general class of cases”. The troublesome part is that 
about making something general in form to extend its application. This is 
one way, but only one way in which we generalize. The difficulty arises if 
we focus obsessively on propositions with a general form, such as “All 
merryjumpers have four legs”. Universal generalizations, and subsequent 
deductions from them, provide a perfectly acceptable way of applying theory 
to numerous cases. In view of the frequent shortage of universally true 
generalizations in particular domains, it is fortunate that there are 
alternatives. 
 Consider statistical generalization. Statisticians make generalizations 
from a sample to a population. Emphasis may be placed on randomization, 
that is the way in which the sample has been randomly selected. However, 
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this is only a means to an end. If we have doubts about the random nature of 
the selection, then we are likely to check whether a sample of people is 
similar to the relevant population in terms of things such as age profile, 
gender composition, geographical distribution, and social class. What we do 
is to check that the sample and the population are similar in terms of known 
values of certain variables. We are then convinced that the sample is likely to 
be similar in terms of the values of other variables which we are 
investigating. This may refer to the proportion of people who will vote for a 
particular option in a referendum, or the percentage who will like the 
company’s new product. This use of inference by similarity is a form of 
reasoning by analogy (analogical reasoning). The importance of this form of 
reasoning as an alternative to deduction will soon become clear.     
 
Generalizing the Particular  
 Winch acknowledges that theory can be formed by induction. This 
involves “the production of generalized propositions through the 
accumulation of conclusions derived from experience” (Winch, 2010, p.186). 
This is often known as enumerative induction. By observing lots of swans, 
we draw up a proposition in a general form which we believe applies to all 
swans. This is perfectly true, but it is not the sole means by which we can 
generalize from the particular case.  
 If we envisage the particular case as something akin to the 
observation of the properties possessed by a single swan or merryjumper, 
then it becomes very difficult to construct any theory about why experience 
is important to a practitioner. Plenty has been written about expertise, viewed 
primarily as the development of skills or knowing how (e.g. Winch, 2010), 
but knowledge of particular cases is often seen as being of minor value.  
 This paper has stressed the importance of causal relationships. 
Fortunately, knowledge about the cause of a specific event is nothing like 
knowledge of one particular swan. A single causal event always forms the 
basis for generalization. Even though we are not sure which causal 
mechanism is operating, we do believe that if exactly the same set of 
circumstances occur again, they will result in the same effect. We believe 
this for roughly the same reasons that we believe in the repeatability of 
scientific experiments if the conditions are exactly the same.  
 
Case-Based Reasoning, Problem Solutions and the Importance of 
Experience                  
 The field of case-based reasoning takes this one step further. In this 
tradition, a case is a solution to a problem. Case-based reasoning argues 
simply that the same problem is likely to have the same solution, and that 
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similar problems are likely to have similar solutions. These are not infallible 
methods of reasoning, but they are reliable. 
 In more recent years, case-based reasoning has been seen as 
something that will be carried out by computers, and human uses of such 
reasoning, outside the field of legal precedent, have been somewhat 
neglected. Perhaps now is the time to end that neglect. Whoever or whatever 
is doing the reasoning, a case base (database) is built up by storing solutions 
to problems arrived at by humans. The cases are often referred to in this 
tradition as experiences, reflecting the fact that they are usually derived from 
the experience of experts in a particular field.  
 Ian Watson has sketched out a number of the basic ideas. He asked 
“why resolve a problem each time if someone has already solved it? Would 
it not be simpler to remember the solution?” (Watson, 1997, p.11), and 
thought that “in general people understand and trust precedents but are less 
comfortable with abstract rules” (Watson, 1997, p.48). He argued that “we 
do not always reason by using rules and first principles. Very often we solve 
problems by relying on our experience of similar problems we have 
encountered in the past” (Watson, 1997, p.197).  
 Regardless of whether they have heard of case-based reasoning or 
not, this is what experienced practitioners do all the time. A novice, asking a 
more experienced colleague how to solve a problem, is quite likely to be 
told, “I remember a case like this. The problem was solved in the following 
way. Perhaps that may be of use in getting to grips with your problem”.  This 
approach paves the way for an explanation of why experience is important. 
Experts accumulate a store of problem solutions. The more problem 
solutions they possess, the easier it is to find a problem that is similar to the 
current problem with which they are faced.  
 Returning to the specifics of case-based reasoning, Janet Kolodner 
(1992), in one of the classic papers on the subject, outlined more of the 
central concepts. She stressed that this is about not just copying solutions, 
but “adapting old solutions to new problems” (Kolodner, 1992, p.3). 
Adaptation of previous solutions “is almost always preferable to generating a 
solution from scratch” (Kolodner, 1992, p.8). The cases used should include 
solutions that were not a success, to warn of possible failures (Kolodner, 
1992, p.4) and of possible problems that may arise (Kolodner, 1992, p.7). 
Feedback is important in order to evaluate solutions (Kolodner, 1992, p.6). 
Solutions should be testable.  
 “A case-based approach …requires a retrieval mechanism that can 
retrieve similar cases, an adaptation mechanism that must be quite creative, 
and a validation mechanism that can decide if a proposed explanation has 
any merit” (Kolodner, 1992, p.14). “In general, cases are useful in 
constructing arguments and justifying positions when there are no concrete 
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principles or only a few of them, if principles are inconsistent, or if their 
meanings are not well-specified” (Kolodner, 1992, p.16). They will therefore 
be useful where the theory handed down to practitioners is incomplete. 
  “CBR [case-based reasoning] relies on the concept of similarity, 
which focuses on the attributes shared by two entities. Analogy is based on 
comparing the abstract structure of two entities” (Richter & Weber, 2013, 
p.534). In a vocational setting, of particular interest will be two cases with a 
similar causal structure. Fortunately, that aspect of case-based reasoning has 
been partly carried forward in the literature on reasoning by analogy. 
 
Abstraction, Universalizability and Generalizability                  
 There are two important aspects to theory which I want to highlight – 
scope and universality. All generalizations have a wider or narrower scope. 
In our earlier generalization, a claim was made only about the number of legs 
possessed by merryjumpers. The claim did not extend to any other creature. 
We might say that its scope was limited to the class of merryjumpers. On the 
other hand, a claim was made about all merryjumpers. It was therefore a 
universal claim.  
 In order to make this important distinction, it may be useful to use the 
term generalizability to apply to the scope of a theoretical claim, and 
universalizability to apply to the extent to which it approaches 100% 
applicability within the specified scope.  There will often be a trade-off 
between these two variables. The broader the scope of our theory, the less 
likely it is to apply to all of the cases within the scope of that theory.  
 Although we may often think of abstraction as being first and 
foremost associated with the more general, this is really just a side effect. 
The key characteristic of abstraction is the loss of information (Kohls & 
Wedekind, 2011, p.13) or information reduction (Saitta & Zucker, 2013, 
p.118). The use of abstraction tends to increase generalizability in the sense I 
have used it, in that it removes a lot of detail and hence makes a claim 
potentially applicable to a greater number of cases. Where abstraction is 
pushed too far, universalizability, in my use of the word, will suffer. There 
will be more and more exceptions to a relevant theoretical principle.  
 Kolodner (1992, p.20) pointed out situations where generalized cases 
could be stored when several related cases all suggest the same solution. A 
degree of abstraction can be applied to particular cases (Bergmann & Wilke, 
2005; Bergmann et al, 2006). Kohls & Wedekind (2011, p.13) thought that 
design patterns “are not fixed designs nor are they very abstract designs. 
Patterns are at a medium level of abstraction”. Design patterns will therefore 
be of use in storing generalized cases. This is the second reason why the 
practitioner is not left helpless in the face of deficiencies in academic or 
scientific theory. He or she can develop theory incrementally from the 
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bottom up through the use of abstraction.  The practitioner may, of course, 
use enumerative induction to start to create theory, but he or she has other 
alternatives. By removing information that is specific to a particular situation 
from the individual case (especially specific information about a causal 
relationship), generalization can take place without enumerative induction.  
 Each time information loss takes place, the generalized cases have to 
be tested to see if they provide a reasonable description of reality. What may 
be found on occasions is that reasoning from the generalized case will throw 
up too many instances where e.g. the effect does not follow from the stated 
cause. The cause-effect relationship holds only at a less abstract level of 
representation, where more detail is required to qualify the situations in 
which the causal relationship applies. It would therefore be a mistake to 
believe that abstraction is always desirable, or that it should be an 
irreversible process. At times we may need to reinsert some details to avoid 
violating the truth. It is necessary sometimes “to be able to climb back down 
the ladder of abstraction and judge where to stop, i.e. recognise which level 
is most appropriate for a specific technological purpose” (Layton, 1993, 
p.58).  
 In general, if the truth about a particular domain can be captured in a 
few very broadly applicable principles, from which particular conclusions 
can be deduced, then a high level of abstraction may be appropriate. 
However, if a vocational domain can most accurately be described by a very 
large number of principles with limited scope, then abstraction will be less of 
a virtue. We may say of the latter type of domain that the devil is in the 
detail. If relatively small changes in circumstances can prevent the effect 
following the hypothesized cause, then it may be more productive to reason 
from a particular case.  
 The difficulty here is that very general theory is usually not taught 
alongside a large number of cases. At best, a small number of examples will 
be used to illustrate the principle being presented. Depending on the 
background of the teacher, the large number of cases available to the expert 
practitioner may or may not be accessible to the academic. They are certainly 
not likely to be available to the student (except, perhaps, through some kind 
of apprenticeship alongside an expert practitioner). A lot of theory is simply 
presented to students with the detail more or less permanently discarded. On 
the deductive model, the detail is not important. Where the theory falls rather 
short of universal applicability, we often need to get the detail back.  
 It will be useful at this point to borrow an idea from image 
compression to make a distinction between lossy and lossless abstraction. 
Lossless abstraction will involve the retention of all the information 
temporarily discarded during the abstraction process. It can therefore be 
reinserted into theory if the degree of abstraction is found to be too high to 
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describe reality accurately. Expert practitioners typically engage in this kind 
of abstraction. Lossy abstraction will involve the more or less permanent 
discarding of information in the belief that the theory is sufficient to support 
a deductive approach in which particular conclusions can be derived from 
universal generalizations. This kind of abstraction is more characteristic of 
academics.  
 I have argued that, in vocational contexts, the main priority is to 
come up with a theory about how to solve a problem. Central to this process 
will be the identification of cause-and-effect theory. That theory may be of 
greater or lesser scope, depending on the susceptibility of a particular 
vocational domain to being described accurately by broad generalizations.  
The causal mechanisms will form a continuum ranging from the very broad 
claims in what academics and scientists would see as an organized body of 
theory, down to the causal principles of the practitioner’s world which 
operate in a narrower range of specific circumstances. There is no 
justification here for building a Berlin Wall to separate academic and 
practitioner theory.  
 
Abstraction and the Normative Use of Cases 
 Reasoning from legal precedent is used in cases where relevant 
statute law does not exist, or where the meaning of certain terms in 
legislation needs to be defined in case law. It provides clues about how 
abstraction can be applied to the normative aspects of problem solutions. It 
has been argued that “the probability that a court will decide a new case in 
the same way as would the court which decided one of the cases cited 
becomes less and less as the differences between the facts of the two cases 
increase” (Cross, 1968, p.39). Lawyers will maintain that there are material 
differences between the cases which mean that any principle established in 
an earlier case does not apply in a different case. 
 The principles or rules used by judges are deemed to be valid in a 
particular set of circumstances. They are not universal generalizations – 
“rules need to be qualified” (Cross, 1968, p.190). Weinreb (2005, p.88) 
points out that “when a court wants to overrule a prior case without quite 
saying so, it declares that the rule of that case ‘is limited to its own facts’”. 
 “Precedent is said to be a function of equality by treating like cases 
alike…Legal certainty, predictability and previsibility are considered 
cardinal principles” (Jacob, 2014, p.13). This approach may be applied 
directly to certain vocational situations, such as when a shop deals equitably 
with customer complaints, or where a public authority treats applications for 
services in a similar manner in similar circumstances. Previous business 
decisions may also just give an indication of what was deemed to an 
acceptable solution to a problem. Faithful to the covenant with values, a 
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design pattern can be used to store acceptable outcomes and the means used 
to bring them about (means-end packages). 
 We can see, however, that “reasoning by precedent usually involves 
bouncing between a general idea and its particular application” (Jacob, 2014, 
p.11). The law does arrive at general (but not universal) principles and this 
means that we have “abstraction beyond the concrete case” (Jacob, 2014, 
p.74). However, there are cases in which these general principles break 
down. Precedents, involving principles and specific circumstances can be 
seen “as legal devices of medium-level abstraction” (Jacob, 2014, p.80). 
Where a principle overreaches itself, claiming application in too wide a 
range of cases, it is time to climb back down the abstraction ladder and limit 
the principle to a narrower range of circumstances.  
 Similarly, in storing valuable solutions in a design pattern, we may 
have to acknowledge that they will only be seen as valuable in certain 
circumstances. There are two obvious things that could go wrong. A change 
in circumstances could mean that a cause would no longer bring about the 
desired effect. Alternatively, different circumstances could generate different 
costs and consequences which would negate the value of the solution used in 
a previous case. This may lead to the search for another past case which is 
more similar to the new problem under consideration. 
 Case-based reasoning is viable in dealing with legal precedents 
because the law uses lossless abstraction. Legal decisions are written up and 
stored in searchable databases. Some abstraction takes place in arriving at 
general principles, but because none of the specific cases have been thrown 
away, they are always available to those who need to reason by analogy.       
 
Wittgenstein’s Games and the Diminishing Influence of Deduction 
 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958, pp.31-32) asked what it is that all games 
have in common. The answer was – nothing. He suggested that there was a 
family resemblance between games. “And we extend our concept of number 
as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread 
does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, 
but in the overlapping of many fibres” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.32). 
 Wittgenstein was challenging the idea that we always classify things 
(subsume them under a particular concept) by the use of necessary and 
sufficient conditions which we can use to deduce conclusions. In doing so, 
he effectively challenged the importance of deduction in our lives. What was 
needed in many cases was a means of identifying similarity. 
 Eleanor Rosch highlighted the empirical work being carried out in the 
field of psychology that was inspired by Wittgenstein’s insight. Her 
suggestion was that we tend to form a mental prototype, an idea of what a 
typical X should be like. These prototypes would be the clearest cases or best 
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examples which would bear a family resemblance to other members of the 
category. A particular instance would be classified as an X if it was similar 
to the prototype. Some instances would be seen as better examples of an X 
than others depending on how close to the prototype they were (Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975). The thought process was more analogical than deductive.  
 A popular alternative to this theory, which also has some empirical 
support, is based on exemplars. Nosofsky (2011, p.18) explained that 
“people represent categories by storing individual exemplars (or examples) 
in memory, and classify objects based on their similarity to these stored 
exemplars…This exemplar view of categorization contrasts dramatically 
with major alternative approaches that assume that people form abstract 
summary representations of categories”. Prototype and exemplar theories are 
consistent with the view set out in this paper that people regularly use both 
abstraction and case-based reasoning (Didierjean & Cauzinille-Marmèche, 
1998). In both cases we have to think analogically to detect similarities. 
 The main point of relevance to this paper is that reasoning by analogy 
is not some peripheral feature of human thought. It is absolutely central. We 
are constantly using it every day. As Hofstadter & Sander (2013, p.3) claim, 
“without concepts there can be no thought, and without analogies there can 
be no concepts”. 
 
Analogy and Causality 
 We have seen that a practitioner may recall that a current problem is 
similar to a previously solved problem. The similarity is established by 
analogical reasoning, but it is not just any kind of similarity. 
 “Two situations are analogous if they share a common pattern of 
relationships among their constituent elements, even though the elements 
themselves differ across the two situations. …Typically one analog, termed 
the source or base, is more familiar or better understood than the second 
analog, termed the target. By ‘better understood’ we mean that the reasoner 
has prior knowledge about functional relations within the source analog – 
beliefs that certain aspects of the source have causal, explanatory, or logical 
connections to other aspects” (Holyoak, 2013, p.234). Moving beyond the 
question of categorization, to the area of finding solutions to problems, the 
psychology literature exhibits a strong consensus that it is these structural 
similarities which lead to the most productive and reliable uses of reasoning 
by analogy (Gentner & Colhoun, 2010; Lee & Holyoak, 2008;  Goswami, 
2001; Ross & Kennedy, 1990; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995).  
 This conclusion is endorsed in a thorough philosophical study of 
analogy (Bartha, 2010). Belated philosophical interest in analogy is also 
evidenced in Shelley (2002) and Bach (2012). For our purposes, the most 
important structural relationship is one involving causality.  
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 “Analogies are employed in all sciences to demonstrate the 
plausibility of hypotheses” (Bartha, 2010, p.2). This was confirmed in 
observation studies of molecular biologists and immunologists’ lab meetings 
(Dunbar & Blanchette, 2001; Dunbar, 2001). When asked later what had 
suggested a solution to a problem, scientists had often forgotten that an 
analogical argument had played a major role (Dunbar, 2001, p.318-319). 
They had climbed a ladder and then kicked it away. This tendency to 
forgetfulness may partly explain why we underestimate the significance of 
analogy.  
 “The importance of relational knowledge to successful analogising 
may also explain why analogies are a good correlate of IQ. Children with a 
deeper conceptual understanding of a given domain will have represented 
more of the relationships that hold within that domain, and thus will be able 
to solve more complex analogies set within that domain” (Goswami, 1992, 
p.117). The same is true of experts within an occupational domain. The more 
knowledge they have of causal relationships, the better they will be at 
solving problems by analogical reasoning. 
 
Studying Problems Without Solutions 
 There are educational strategies which involve the study of problems. 
One of these is the case method, closely associated with the Harvard 
Business School. It is sometimes also referred to as a case study method, 
which is a little confusing, as the term case study is also associated with a 
research methodology involving things like surveys, interviews, observation 
and the examination of documents (Rippin et al, 2002; Yin, 2003). 
 In the Harvard version, the emphasis is on studying real world 
business problems. “A case is a partial, historical, clinical study of a situation 
which has confronted a practising administrator or managerial group” 
(Barnes et al, 1994, p.44).  Students will discuss these problems and suggest 
their own solutions. Typically, they will not study actual outcomes. The 
success or failure of proposed solutions implemented by a real business 
would not be a major focus of this approach. 
 Closely related to the case method is problem-based learning, 
developed by Howard Barrows while he was teaching medical students at 
McMaster University in Canada. “PBL [problem-based learning] is an 
instructional (and curricular) learner-centred approach that empowers 
learners to conduct research, integrate theory and practice, and apply 
knowledge and skills to develop a viable solution to a defined 
problem…students work in collaborative groups to identify what they need 
to learn in order to solve a problem, engage in self-directed learning, apply 
their knowledge to the problem” (Savery, 2015, pp.7-8). 
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 Focusing on ethical problems in education, Meira Levinson and 
Jacob Fay proposed the study of “normative case studies, which we define as 
richly described, realistic accounts of complex ethical dilemmas that arise 
within practice or policy contexts, in which protagonists must decide among 
courses of action, none of which is self-evident as the right one to take” 
(Levinson & Fay, 2016, pp.5-6). This approach is partly inspired by a 
scepticism “that any meaningfully complex problems of ethical practice can 
be reliably solved by the application of a very general theory” (Levinson & 
Fay, 2016, p.6). 
 Each of these approaches has major merits. The study of realistic 
problems can certainly help to bridge the gap between theory and practice. 
There may, however, be a major piece of the jigsaw missing. The study of 
real life outcomes of proposed solutions would enhance this kind of learning. 
Howard Barrows himself acknowledged the importance of the accumulation 
of past solutions in improving clinical diagnosis. 
 “If a clinician has had extensive experience with certain patient 
problems, he will easily recall the most effective hypotheses or diagnoses 
when confronted by that problem” (Barrows & Pickell, 1991, p.8).  
 The difficulty may be that a student will not have sufficient 
experience to know what information to look for or have sufficient 
knowledge of causal mechanisms to arrive at a viable solution. The danger is 
that, in the absence of a study of actual outcomes of proposed solutions, the 
student will simply suggest a strategy that goes untested. 
 It is not necessary that students be presented with actual outcomes of 
their kind of solution at the beginning of the exercise (although they could 
be). These can be presented at the end as part of the process of evaluating a 
proposed student solution. This is also true of suggestions about how to 
address ethical issues. A proposed solution to an ethical dilemma may be 
based on little more than good intentions. It can be extremely helpful to 
show, as part of the evaluation, that solutions similar to that proposed by 
students have, in the past, had a particular outcome. This will be useful in 
assessing the costs and consequences of various options, and making 
students aware of perhaps unforeseen causal relationships. 
 Problem solving may, in part, be a generic skill. It is also, however, 
influenced by the experience of the problem solver. The more domain 
specific solutions to problems a practitioner possesses, the easier it will be 
solve new problems (Lancaster and Kolodner, 1987). Fortunately, it is not 
always necessary for the practitioner to learn all of this from his or her own 
experience (Orr, 1996; Lucas et al, 2012; Kolodner, 1997). It can also be 
learned from more experienced practitioners, implicitly or explicitly 
articulated in design patterns.   
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 Does a study of specific problems enable generalization and move us 
beyond the present and the particular (Bailey, 1984)? It does if they are 
exemplary. We noticed that in statistics, a sample is generalized to some 
wider population because the sample is similar in relevant respects to that 
population. If a specific problem is very similar to many other problems 
which a practitioner is likely to face, it could be described as exemplary. The 
solution will be applicable, possibly with some adaptations, to a wide range 
of problems. It will be generalizable not because of the form it takes (e.g. 
“All x are y”), but because causal and normative reality is structured in such 
a way that there are a lot of similar problems which often require similar 
solutions.  
 
Conclusion 
 Universally true generalizations from which specific conclusions can 
be deduced are extremely useful to practitioners. Unfortunately they are 
often not available. Faced with deficiencies in academic or scientific theory, 
practitioners have the option of engaging in case-based reasoning, or of 
proposing causal principles of limited scope. These causal principles can be 
generalized through abstraction, and the difference between them and the 
causal theory of an academic body of knowledge will be just one of degree 
and scope. They form parts of a continuum. 
 The aim of the practitioner will often be to develop a theory about 
how to solve a problem. These practitioner theories can be encapsulated in 
design patterns, which may include references to universal generalizations, 
models, appropriate cases, practitioner knowledge of causes and effects, 
normative goals and principles, and the skills needed to implement the 
solution. Design patterns provide a means of reusing past solutions and 
avoiding the need to constantly return to first principles. They can provide a 
data structure focused on the solution of common vocational problems. 
Reasoning from particular cases or design patterns will be primarily by the 
use of analogy. The more problem solutions an expert practitioner is aware 
of, the better is his or her problem solving ability likely to be. 
 One merit of this way of thinking is that it should be easily 
recognizable by the practitioner. He or she may not use terms like analogical 
reasoning or abstraction, but it should not be a difficult task, for example, to 
draw a practitioner’s attention to the way in which he or she argues that 
similar problems require similar solutions. Describing the causal knowledge 
which academics and practitioners possess does not require exotic 
classification systems which separate vertical and horizontal knowledge. We 
should not violate our common sense way of describing things where there is 
no particular gain (Pring, 1977).  
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 This paper makes no assumptions about where vocational education 
takes place. It could be in an educational institution or in the workplace. 
However, the study of exemplary problems and solutions, which can later be 
used as the basis for analogical reasoning, can be an important part of 
vocational education, wherever it is delivered. 
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